Some reason to hope for better days

ON a Mediterranean island where even the stones sing of its history, it is not surprising that Cypriots carry cruel memories and stories in their hearts like a leaden weight.

More than anything else, it is these stories, well rehearsed and repeated ad nauseam, that prevent people on both sides of the dividing line from imagining and implementing a cohesive social and political union among all the island’s lawful inhabitants, be they Greek, Turkish, Armenian, Maronite, Latin or of other ethnic origin or religion.

This is not to look at the Cyprus problem through rose tinted glasses. There are more than a few objective obstacles that would make reaching a fair settlement difficult even if the Cypriots were able to reconcile and put their inter-communal difference behind them.

In a world ruled by powerful interests and forces, whether on a global or regional scale, the interests of small states, especially strategically important ones like Cyprus, rarely matter much. Such states are only nominally sovereign as a kind of fiction of international law.

It may not be just or fair, but politics on an international scale has to be played with rules of engagement that favour the powerful. In the Cypriot context, this has always meant that our local differences cannot be played out in a vacuum. We are in a region where our problem impacts and is impacted by larger Greek-Turkish relations, the problems of the Middle East, the war against terror, oil and gas politics and relations among the great powers, particularly the Americans, the larger EU states and the Russians, to mention only a few.

Nevertheless, if we are ever going to make peace and re-unite some day, the people and leaders of our two largest communities have to find it within themselves to break free of the shackles of our modern history and envision a political, economic and social union in Cyprus that transcends our separate identities as Greeks or Turks, Christians or Muslims.

It would be far more difficult for powerful interests outside Cyprus to play the game of divide and rule, if the island’s communities were not willing to play along.

This is why recent events on the Greek side give us some reason to hope for better days. In the coming presidential elections, the basic choice for Greek Cypriots will be whether to continue with the leadership of Tassos Papadopoulos, or to pass on the baton of leadership to Ioannis Kasoulides or Demetris Christofias.

With Papadopoulos at the helm, the prospects for resumption of meaningful talks between the two sides on the island are dim. Unless some unforeseen external event happens that motivates the international community to pressure the sides back to the table, we can safely predict that nothing will happen quickly to break the impasse resulting from the rejection in 2004 of the UN Secretary-general’s plan by the Greek Cypriot community.

Until it became clear that the collective leadership of AKEL had decided to contest next year’s presidential election, Papadopoulos had avoided studiously making any opening directly to the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, and has made no secret of the fact that he sees Mr Talat as a pawn of the Turkish state.

On the Turkish side, Papadopoulos is seen as the heir of Greek Cypriot nationalist forces that in their view attempted to usurp the constitutional rights of the Turkish Cypriot community by force and expelled their representatives from positions in the government, compelling most of them to withdraw into enclaves for their self-defence and survival.

This is baggage that neither Christofias nor Kasoulides has to bear. Christofias has the advantage of being cut from the same ideological cloth as Mr Talat, whereas Kasoulides comes from the party that more than any other in recent times has attempted to make openings and friendly gestures to bridge the chasm separating the two communities.

Christofias and Kasoulides seem to understand that one of the prerequisites for a lasting reconciliation between our two main communities is the need to foster a climate of mutual trust and respect as an antidote to the merciless grip on our collective psyches of those deep seated fears and suspicions that have poisoned our relations for generations, especially among those under the age of 50 who have never known a time of relative inter-communal friendship.

In addition, Papadopoulos is understandably perceived by many in the international community as someone not to be trusted. There are many notable figures in the international community who believe sincerely that Papadopoulos played a duplicitous game in the failed negotiations of 2002-2004.

In their view, he used the more honest intransigence of Rauf Denktash to disguise his own, and pretended to be open to negotiation on the UN plan until Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots exposed his true intentions by accepting the arbitration of the UN Secretary-general.

Both Christofias and Kasoulides enjoy a significantly better reputation than Papadopoulos for playing the diplomatic game with integrity. We must never forget that our greatest asset in the diplomatic arena is our legitimacy as a recognised state, notwithstanding more than 40 years of constitutional anomaly and breakdown of the agreements that brought Cyprus into existence.

The most damaging aspect of the way in which Papadopoulos has handled the Cyprus file since he took over as president has been the widespread perception internationally that it is the Greek Cypriot community and not the Turkish Cypriots or Turkey who are primarily responsible for the lack of a settlement. If this perception does not change, the most likely outcome will be the slow but inexorable de facto recognition of the administration in the north.

This will further cement the division on Cyprus, and over time will make a settlement less and less palatable on both sides of our divided island.

More fundamentally, Kasoulides and Christofias represent mainstream Cypriot political life more so than Papadopoulos. It is these broad social forces that must be united on the “national question” to deliver the votes to ratify any settlement by referendum.

What many may have lost sight of is that one effect of our rejection of the UN plan in 2004 is that the Turkish Cypriot community may not be quite so anxious to vote for a reunited Cyprus the next time.

Many on the other side see polls and hear political statements from this side that lead them to think that a majority of Greek Cypriots do not want to be reunited with them in a partnership state. For all their isolation, the economic situation in the north has improved since the referenda and going forward it will take a strong and united leadership, whether under Christofias or Kasoulides, to convince ordinary Turkish Cypriots that we sincerely share their desire for a federal, bi-zonal and bi-communal solution.

Precious time has been lost since the referenda in establishing a climate favourable to the resumption of negotiations when all the stakeholders are ready. Meetings between the communities’ leaders may not be sufficient to bridge the differences that need to be overcome before comprehensive negotiations can resume, but they can serve the useful purpose of signalling mutual good will and sincere desire to move closer to the desired outcome.

We need to encourage contact between the communities at all levels. Meetings between the leaders serve the useful symbolic purpose of signalling to the people on both sides, especially those trapped in the past, that progress is not made by those who shun each other.

By meeting and talking to each other respectfully and with a willingness to see each others point of view we can at least improve the climate for comprehensive negotiations when the time is ripe.

While it is undoubtedly true that Cyprus cannot afford another failed attempt to settle the problem, we have to be prepared to take measured risks if we are to start building a better tomorrow for all our people.