The irony of history in Cyprus

THERE is an ancient adage from English common law that says possession is nine tenths of the law. This reflects the fundamental reality that someone who is in possession of property is able to use it and enjoy the fruits derived from its use, and most practically it is very difficult to disturb or take away the property over which he has possession.

Cyprus serves as a good illustration of the truth behind the adage, where 33 years since the invasion, more than a quarter of a million Cypriots are still unable to return to their homes in peace and security on either side of the Green Line.

Three years after the rejection of the Annan plan by the Greek Cypriot community, we see the Turkish Cypriot authority permitting the development of Greek Cypriot properties on an unprecedented scale. In particular, the Morphou area is being opened up to development in a way that will greatly complicate the resolution of the property aspect of the Cyprus problem if the parties ever get back to the negotiating table.

This is not to try and resurrect a discussion on the virtues or vices of the Annan plan or the wisdom or folly of its rejection by the Greek Cypriot community. That is the road not taken. We will all have to wait for the verdict of history and move on with the times.

What is undeniable is that the period leading up to Cyprus’ EU accession in 2004 offered a rare opportunity to settle the problem, as the Turkish government abandoned the policy of ‘no solution is the solution’ held by its predecessors since the 1974, and gave its support to the efforts of the international community to broker a settlement on the lines of the agreed UN framework: a federal, bi-communal and bi-zonal republic.

Of course, we now know that elements within the Turkish military and the ‘deep state’ in Turkey were contemplating a coup to thwart any settlement on the lines of the Annan plan, but we will never know what the fate of the plan would have been, as our leader got the resounding ‘no’ he so emotionally pleaded for.

No wonder anti-settlement forces on the Turkish side see him as their saviour.The fact is that President Papadopoulos, rightly or wrongly, is seen by the international community as not being truly interested in a settlement consistent with the agreed framework. He can argue until the cows come home that our rejection of the Annan plan was simply a rejection of that specific plan and not of the underlying principles, but until he shows his cards with specifics as to what he sees as the outlines of a settlement his demonising of the Annan plan will convince most observers and many on the other side that all his talk of a settlement is so much jockeying for position to preserve the position of the Greek Cypriot community as the custodian of the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus. Will there be another historic opportunity for a settlement? One can hope, but the prospects for the moment are not auspicious.

It is common knowledge that the only incentive for Turkey to compromise on Cyprus is its own accession to the EU. Having been absolved of any responsibility for the impasse by the events of 2004 and having secured a road map for accession negotiations that does not require it to do more than open its ports and harbors to Cypriot flagged traffic at some point during the negotiations, one should not expect serious concessions from the Turkish side until its accession is virtually certain.

With the election of Nicholas Sarkozy in France and Angela Merkel in Germany, we can predict that Turkey’s accession process will at the very least become more problematic and will slow down even further. Unless there is a significant shift in public opinion in the leading states of the EU over the next few years, it would not be surprising if the EU at some point changes tack and makes it clear to Turkey that its best hope is to negotiate a special relationship with the EU falling short of full membership.

If that were to happen, it is unlikely that the EU would make solution of the Cyprus problem a precondition of a special relationship. On the contrary, the pressure would be on us to agree to such a special relationship and not to do anything that would put at risk a European solution to the Turkish accession problem.

Undoubtedly, the UN will soldier on and try to kick start the process agreed to last summer. Perhaps with pressure from various sides, the technical committees may meet and may even get down to some substantive discussions.

Everyone will probably agree, however, that the time is not right to reopen negotiations for a comprehensive solution. Apart from anything else, the best we can hope for is that Mr.Erdogan and the military in Turkey will come to a modus vivendi that will allow the continuation of Turkey’s EU path. A coup in Turkey or a victory by the hard Kemalist factions would spell the end of that path and remove any incentive for a Cyprus compromise.

Even a renewed and strengthened mandate for Erdogan would not do much in the near term for comprehensive negotiations.Of course, a lot can happen to change the political scenery and set up new circumstances for another ‘historic opportunity’ to solve the Cyprus problem. But if the past is any guide, these sorts of opportunities are rare birds indeed.

Having rejected the last one, based in part at least on the calculation that our EU membership would strengthen our negotiating position, perhaps the greatest irony of all would be Turkey, the EU, or both turning away from the accession process. In such an outcome the greatest loser would be Cyprus.