The Asia Minor disaster

ONE of the most inane arguments used against Yiannis Kasoulides is that, back in 2004, he had expressed the view that a rejection of a settlement by Greek Cypriots would be tantamount to an Asia Minor disaster.

Though unable to find the actual transcript, I am prepared to accept that Kasoulides did make a statement to the effect that, in the event of a rejection of the Annan plan, the situation arising would be analogous to that of the Asia Minor disaster of 1922.

I must say that I too have many times used in this column the example of the Asia Minor catastrophe in comparing it to the consequences of the Turkish invasion in Cyprus. And I agree with Kasoulides that these two events are comparable. In fact, proportionately speaking, the aftermath of the destruction in Cyprus was far more serious than that in Asia Minor, as I am about to argue below.

But before moving on, I think it important to note Kasoulides’ unfathomable omission to respond to the silly accusations hurled by these clueless slogan peddlers.

Unless I’m mistaken, the first person to have used this catchphrase was President Papadopoulos, who incidentally is well known for his ignorance of historical affairs but also for his obsession with twisting historical truth in relation to events in which he was personally involved, such as the bloody intercommunal clashes of 1963 (“How many Turkish Cypriots were murdered from 1964 to 1974? The answer is none.” – Papadopoulos, interview with the Khaleej Times, September 4, 2004. Correct answer: about 620.)

But let’s get to the point.

What was the result of the 1922 disaster? Some 1.4 million Greeks lost their property and were moved to mainland Greece, which at the time had a population of 3.5 million. In other words, the refugees amounted to 40 per cent of the host population.

What were the corresponding figures in Cyprus? According to official data, there were 200,000 refugees out of the 500,000-strong Greek Cypriot population in 1974. That is, the refugees amounted to 40 per cent of the population that took them in, which is exactly the same percentage as in the case of 1922.

Now, what were the results of the ‘No’ in the 2004 referendum? These people definitively lost their properties and remained in the south, just as the refugees of 1922 stayed in Greece. So where did Kasoulides go wrong, and where did he exaggerate?

Proportionately speaking, was the outcome not the same? I also said, however, that by comparison the case of Cyprus is worse. This is because in 1922 the tragedy ended with the resettlement of the refugees, who from there on could live in their new homes in safety. But what about Cyprus? Do our refugees, or even non-refugees, live in safety? Certainly not.

The ‘No’ of the referendum has left here two divisions of the Turkish army, and no one knows whether these troops shall one day reach Paphos, in which case 100 per cent of the population would become refugees.

Moreover, because of the ‘No’, half of the refugees missed the chance to have their properties returned in Famagusta, Morphou and other areas. Even refugees hailing from other places lost the opportunity to reclaim part of their property or exchange these with Turkish Cypriot properties in the south or receive compensation, even if under a timetable.

But the refugees of 1922 never missed these opportunities, as they were never asked to vote in a referendum. Also, one should bear in mind that the Greeks in Asia Minor comprised just 19.2 per cent of the population, whereas in Cyprus they made up 82 per cent. So who can deny that the case of Cyprus is comparatively far worse than that of Asia Minor, as far as its aftermath goes?

Is it Kasoulides who is wrong, or rather Papadopoulos and the clueless demagogues who sarcastically tell him to apologise? Instead, it is they who should apologise for voting for partition, allowing the Turkish military to remain in Cyprus and for giving away Famagusta and Morphou to Turkey.